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LEGITIMACY, AUTHORITY, AND THE
RIGHT TO AFFORDABLE BAIL
Colin Starger* and Michael Bullock**
ABSTRACT
Bail reform is hot. Over the past two years, jurisdictions around the country
have moved to limit or end money bail practices that discriminate against the poor.
Although cheered on by many, bail reform is vehemently opposed by the powerful
bail-bond industry. In courts around the country, lawyers representing this industry
have argued that reform is unnecessary, and even unconstitutional. One particularly
insidious argument advanced by bail-bond apologists is that a “wall of authority”
supports the proposition that “bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is
unable to pay it.”1 In other words, authority rejects the right to affordable bail.
This Article critically examines this “wall of authority” and evaluates the true
doctrinal standing of the right to affordable bail. After developing a novel rhetorical
account of legitimacy in constitutional argument, this Article demonstrates that
authority supporting the bail-bond position is illegitimate in two senses—it is
formally invalid and normatively “out of bounds.” The authority is formally invalid
because it originates from a single implausible constitutional interpretation and is
then echoed blindly in the name of following precedent. It is normatively inappro-
priate because it ignores Supreme Court doctrine that requires equal justice for
indigents facing incarceration.
Some walls are obstacles to freedom and justice. To liberate Eastern bloc
societies oppressed by totalitarianism, President Ronald Reagan famously implored
Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin Wall. The metaphorical “wall of author-
ity” endorsed by the bail-bond industry also imperils liberty—so this Article tears
it down with original rhetorical theory and robust doctrinal analysis.
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. JD Columbia Law
School, 2002. The author wishes to thank Zina Makar, Douglas Colbert, Alec Karakatsanis,
and Tim Schnacke for helpful comments. This Article was produced with the support of a
University of Baltimore Summer Research grant.
** Member of the Maryland Bar. JD University of Baltimore School of Law, 2017.
1 Memorandum from Paul D. Clement et al., Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Constitutionality of
Maryland Bail Procedures 6 (Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Clement Memo] (quoting Hodgdon
v. United States, 365 F.2d 679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966)).
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We are going to build a great border wall . . . .2
—Donald Trump, 2016
Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!3
—Ronald Reagan, 1987
INTRODUCTION
A powerful lobby wants you to believe that wealthy Americans have a stronger
right to liberty than poor Americans. In courts around the country, this lobby’s
lawyers argue that a “wall of authority” supports the proposition that our criminal
justice system may constitutionally discriminate against the indigent. Although this
may sound far-fetched or even conspiratorial, it is entirely accurate. Consider the
following true story.
In early January 2017, the Maryland Court of Appeals—the state’s highest
court—held a hearing on a proposed change to judicial rules of procedure governing
pretrial detention of accused criminals.4 One debated provision sought to forbid
judges from imposing bail “with financial terms in form or amount that results in the
2 CNN, Donald Trump’s Entire Republican Convention Speech, YOUTUBE (July 21,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fs0pZ_GrTy8 (at 46:29).
3 Reagan Foundation, “Berlin Wall” Speech—President Reagan’s Address at the
Brandenburg Gate—6/12/87, YOUTUBE (Apr. 15, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=5MDFX-dNtsM (at 11:59).
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pretrial detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially incapa-
ble of meeting that condition.”5 Translated from legalese, this provision essentially
prohibited unaffordable bails.
At the Court of Appeals hearing, the first two speakers favored the proposed
rule. Brian Frosh, Maryland’s Attorney General, led off by advocating for the change
to reform a broken money bond system that he said kept too many Marylanders in
jail strictly because of their poverty.6 Former United States Attorney General Eric
Holder spoke next and emphasized how the current system discriminated against
racial minorities and likely violated equal protection.7 Then a third speaker stepped
to the podium and vociferously opposed the proposed rule. This speaker was Paul
Clement, former Solicitor General of the United States and now a partner at a law
firm representing the bail-bond industry.8
Clement began by conceding that, under existing Maryland rules, “there will be
circumstances where the defendant may face a bond amount that they [sic] can’t
post.”9 However, this raised no constitutional issue because “the Constitution does
not include a right to affordable bail in every case.”10 Clement continued:
I don’t think I’m going out on a limb by saying even at the time
of the framing, not everybody had the same amount of money,
and there were some people who were going to face a bail that
they couldn’t afford, but yet the Constitution doesn’t protect
against that. What it protects against is excessive bail that pre-
vents somebody from having the option of at least posting a bail.
It doesn’t guarantee everyone the means of being able to post the
bail, but it does guarantee the option.11
5 This precise language was subsequently adopted as MD. RULE 4-216.1(e)(1)(A) (West
2017) (effective July 1, 2017).
6 Open Meeting to Consider the One Hundred Ninety-Second Report of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Court of Appeals (Md. 2017)
(testimony of Maryland Att’y Gen. Brian Frosh), https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files
/import/coappeals/media/2017openmtgs/20170105rulesmtgpt1.mp4 (at 10:33 to 40:28).
7 Id. (testimony of Eric Holder, Former United States Att’y Gen.) (at 40:35 to 60:00).
8 Clement is a partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Clement Memo, supra note 1. Before
joining Kirkland & Ellis, he was a partner at Bancroft PLLC, which represented the American
Bail Coalition. See, e.g., Brief for Amici Curiae American Bail Coalition et al. in Support of
Defendant-Appellant and Reversal of the Preliminary Injunction, Walker v. City of Calhoun,
682 Fed. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-10521).
9 Open Meeting to Consider the One Hundred Ninety-Second Report of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Court of Appeals (Md. 2017)
(testimony of Paul Clement, Former United States Solicitor Gen.), https://mdcourts.gov/sites
/default/files/import/coappeals/media/2017openmtgs/20170105rulesmtgpt2.mp4 [hereinafter
COA Hearing, Testimony of Paul Clement] (at 3:03–3:13).
10 Id. at 3:29–3:36.
11 Id. at 4:38–5:04.
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This startling claim flips traditional equal protection logic on its head. If the
Constitution guarantees a bail option only accessible to people with means, the
asserted right is to bail for the wealthy. In fact, the bail-bond industry is pushing this
precise claim in courts around the country.12
How does the bail-bond industry justify a constitutional interpretation blessing
a transparently two-tiered criminal justice system? Before Maryland’s highest court,
Paul Clement relied on doctrinal authority.13 He argued that key equal protection
cases “do not extend to the bail situation” and that a “host of cases” have rejected
applying equal protection to bail “from the earliest days of the republic through and
to the Warren Court.”14 In a prior written submission, he framed the same proposi-
tion more precisely: “[C]ourts have consistently held that ‘bail is not excessive merely
because the defendant is unable to pay it.’”15 Clement dramatically characterized the
purported judicial agreement with his interpretation as a “wall of authority.”16
This Article critically examines this “wall of authority” and evaluates the true
doctrinal standing of the right to affordable bail. After developing a novel account
of legitimacy in constitutional argument, this Article demonstrates that authority
supporting the bail-bond position is illegitimate. Finally, this Article argues that a
legitimate reading of relevant Supreme Court doctrine shows the right to affordable
bail is constitutionally mandated.
While the “wall of authority” metaphor suggests that an unbridgeable barrier
separates bail from equal protection, closer inspection reveals that great swaths of
the so-called wall are as illusory as façades in Hollywood sets. All but one of the
courts that have adopted the proposition that “bail is not excessive merely because
the defendant is unable to pay” have done so based solely on the authority of prior
courts that adopted the same proposition. Yet tracing the proposition back to its
origins shows that the first court to reject the right to affordable bail badly misread
the law and offered no independent reason to accept its conclusion. Subsequent
12 See, e.g., Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977) (Pugh I), vacated en banc
on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (Pugh II); Walker v. City of Calhoun, No.
4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017). These cases are further
discussed infra notes 174–97 and accompanying text.
13 See COA Hearing, Testimony of Paul Clement, supra note 9, at 4:07–4:14.
14 See id. at 3:53–4:14. Clement also agreed that “in terms of this idea that some of the
cases, the Griffin line of cases about the imposing penalties for poverty, those lines do not ex-
tend to the bail situation.” Id. at 3:57–4:08 (referencing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956))).
15 See Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d
679, 687 (8th Cir. 1966), and citing United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Beaman,
631 F.2d 85, 86 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1070 (4th Cir. 1973);
White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968)). This memo was written in response to
an opinion letter released by the Maryland Attorney General’s Office earlier in October 2016
and was submitted to hearings of the Rules Committee that eventually proposed the rules
change ultimately adopted by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1.
16 See discussion infra Part II.
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courts then repeated this misstep in the name of following precedent. This renders
the “wall of authority” argument formally illegitimate.
To justify this conclusion, this Article must first intervene in ongoing theoretical
debates about legitimacy in constitutional argument. Building on recent scholarship,
Part I distinguishes between legitimacy as a formal concept regarding argument
validity and legitimacy as a rhetorical concept regarding whether an argument
violates the norms of constitutional discourse. After introducing a general frame-
work to assess formal and rhetorical legitimacy, this Part differentiates legitimate
from illegitimate ipse dixit argumentation in constitutional law.17
Part II applies the framework introduced in Part I to test the legitimacy of the
constitutional argument that a “wall of authority” supports discrimination against the
poor in the pretrial bail context. It shows how the first court holding that there is no
right to affordable bail committed a formal ipse dixit fallacy. Using innovative
visualizations to “map” the relevant doctrine cited in industry briefs, Part III then
shows how this fallacy was compounded into an illegitimate “echo chamber.”18
Part III argues that the doctrine ostensibly blessing a two-tiered pretrial justice
system is normatively flawed and rhetorically illegitimate. Some walls are obstacles
to freedom and justice. To liberate Eastern bloc societies oppressed by totalitarian-
ism, President Reagan once implored Mikhail Gorbachev to tear down the Berlin
Wall.19 The metaphorical “wall of authority” endorsed by the bail-bond industry also
imperils liberty—and Part III makes the case that this wall, too, needs to be torn
down. In place of illegitimate authority, courts should instead follow the overlooked
competing lines of precedent that support recognition of a right to affordable bail.
The last Part serves as the Article’s Conclusion. This Part replies to potential
objections to recognizing an affordable-bail right.
I. LEGITIMACY AND APPEALS TO AUTHORITY
A central claim of this Article is that the bail-bond industry’s “wall of authority”
argument is formally and rhetorically illegitimate. To justify this claim, this Part
builds on existing scholarship on rhetorical theory and constitutional argument
legitimacy. After analyzing the difference between formal and rhetorical legitimacy,
this Part sets out a new framework to assess each kind of legitimacy, and then uses
17 Ipse dixit is Latin, meaning “he himself said it.” Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014) [hereinafter Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW]. As shown in Section I.C infra, not all
ipse dixit argumentation is fallacious. Propositions that do not require justification by authority
can be proven through ipse dixit reasoning. On the other hand, propositions that do require
justification by authority are fallacious if supported only by ipse dixit argument.
18 Cf. M. Chris Fabricant & Tucker Carrington, The Shifted Paradigm: Forensic Science’s
Overdue Evolution from Magic to Law, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 37 (2016) (introducing the term
“Echo Chamber” to describe the same phenomenon of uncritically repeating doctrinal error
in name of following precedent).
19 See Reagan Foundation, supra note 3.
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the framework to distinguish between formally legitimate and illegitimate ipse dixit
arguments in constitutional law.
A. Two Senses of Argument “Legitimacy”
When describing arguments, the word “legitimacy” is generally used in two dis-
tinct senses. The first sense concerns the “correctness” of an argument. A legitimate
argument is one accepted by the relevant audience as “valid” or “justified.”20 We
call this the formal sense of legitimacy. The second sense concerns the “appropriate-
ness” of an argument. A legitimate argument is recognized by the relevant audience
as one that is “within bounds” to raise, even if the argument is rejected as incom-
plete, weak, or just-plain-wrong.21 We call this the rhetorical sense of legitimacy.22
These two senses of argument legitimacy clearly overlap. Under either sense,
the “relevant audience” judges whether a given argument is legitimate or illegiti-
mate.23 Relevance here is a discursive concept—it depends on the discourse wherein
the debate unfolds.24 An argument deemed legitimate in one discursive field may be
entirely illegitimate in a different field.25 A mathematical debate is different from a
political debate, which is different from a legal debate.26 Furthermore, both types of
20 It is possible to distinguish validity in proof from justification in argument. See, e.g.,
DAVID ZAREFSKY, What Does an Argument Culture Look Like?, RHETORICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON ARGUMENTATION: SELECTED ESSAYS BY DAVID ZAREFSKY 37, 41 (2014) (equating “proof”
with objective truth and “argument” with subjective justification having admitting degrees
of strength). Since our focus is on legal argument, a fundamentally subjective discipline, we
do not refer to proof in its objective or analytical sense. Instead, we interchangeably use terms
like “valid,” “justified,” “right,” and so on to denote arguments accepted as correct by the
relevant audience.
21 See id. at 39.
22 See id.
23 As such, both senses of argument legitimacy are self-justifying concepts grounded in
social fact rather than external reality. See Colin Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1347, 1350 n.12 (2016) [hereinafter Starger, Constitutional Law and
Rhetoric] (“[A] discourse cannot provide independent grounds for its own legitimacy . . . .”);
cf. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 107–08 (2d ed. 1994) (stating that legitimacy of a
system’s ultimate rule of recognition is a social fact); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94 (3d ed. 1996) (“[I]n paradigm choice[,] there is no standard higher
than the assent of the relevant community.”).
24 See Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1358–62.
25 An “argument field” is a technical name for distinct discourse with its own norms. See
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 14 (updated ed. 2003) (providing technical
definition of “argument fields” and explaining that “[t]wo arguments will be said to belong
to the same field when the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respec-
tively, of the same logical type”).
26 As Cha¿m Perelman observes: “Each field of thought requires a different type of discourse;
it is as inappropriate to be satisfied with merely reasonable arguments from a mathematician
as it would be to require scientific proofs from an orator.” CH. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF
RHETORIC 3 (William Kluback trans., 1982).
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legitimacy may be contested by discursive participants.27 As a discourse evolves,
perceived lines of formal and rhetorical legitimacy may shift.28 Given the shared
relationship with audience and discourse, inquiry into both senses of “legitimate”
argument falls within the academic jurisdiction of rhetoric.29
Though more fuzzy than sharp, the distinction between formal and rhetorical ar-
gument legitimacy is useful. Formal legitimacy centers on the idea that an argument’s
success is judged according to a discourse’s formal rules.30 Only formally legitimate
arguments should “win” the official debate.31 Rhetorical legitimacy, on the other hand,
focuses on the meta-dynamics of argument discourse—it represents a second-order
judgment about the appropriateness of first-order formal argument.32 A rhetorically
legitimate argument may formally “lose” by the written “rules of the game,” but it
stays within unwritten bounds.33 Rhetorical argument legitimacy more directly
concerns “norms.”34 As such, rhetorical legitimacy is more fluid and difficult to define
with precision.35
27 All participants in a discourse may agree that certain arguments are valid or appropriate
and that other arguments are invalid or inappropriate, but they might also hotly dispute formal
and rhetorical legitimacy in borderline cases.
28 Arguments once deemed legitimate can become unacceptable; and so too the reverse.
Consider that appeals to racial superiority were not long ago admitted in mainstream Ameri-
can political discourse while such appeals are now (rightly) beyond the pale.
29 As an academic discipline, rhetoric is “where the practical art of persuasion collides
with the abstract theory of how argument moves discourse.” Colin Starger, The DNA of an
Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045, 1051 (2009)
[hereinafter Starger, DNA of an Argument]. Aristotle, the godfather of all rhetorical inquiry,
defined the “art of rhetoric” as “an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means
of persuasion.” ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37 (George A.
Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007) (alteration in original).
30 See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 29, at 1059–60.
31 Of course, this does not mean that the loser of a debate had a formally illegitimate argu-
ment from a neutral academic perspective. On our account, it is possible to have formally
legitimate arguments on both sides of the debate, so long as both arguments are justified by
“plausible reasoning” or “credible authority.” See infra Section I.B. However, a formally
illegitimate argument should lose.
32 See infra Section I.B.
33 Distinguishing the formal and rhetorical “rules of the game” has parallels in academic
disciplines beyond rhetoric. For instance, political scientists refer to society’s “rules of the
game” as “institutions” and distinguish between formal and informal institutions based respec-
tively on written and unwritten rules. See Julia R. Azari & Jennifer K. Smith, Unwritten Rules:
Informal Institutions in Established Democracies, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 37, 38–39 (2012) (citing
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PREFERENCE 3
(1990); Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky, Informal Institutions and Comparative
Politics: A Research Agenda, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 725, 726–28 (2004)).
34 Norms are “imprecise and ambient”; they are “customs and principles” that “lay out
what ought to be, according to unwritten social expectations.” Emily Bazelon, Ground Rules,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 16, 2017, at 9.
35 See id. at 9–10 (“Norms are entirely up to us—they exist only as long as there’s a
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A helpful analogy here comes from basic first-year civil procedure. The differ-
ence between formal and rhetorical argument legitimacy is like the difference
between dismissal of a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
12(b)(6) and the imposition of sanctions under FRCP 11(c).36 Imagine a plaintiff
sues a defendant, and the defendant successfully moves to dismiss for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”37 The court has basically determined
that the plaintiff did not make a formally legitimate argument; the plaintiff’s claim
is legally invalid. Yet recognition of formal illegitimacy does not entail judgment
that the plaintiff made inappropriate arguments that somehow violated the norms of
the federal litigation game. The plaintiff will only be subject to sanctions under Rule
11 if she advanced rhetorically illegitimate arguments—ones made with an “im-
proper purpose” and fundamentally unwarranted by law or fact.38
Do not interpret this analogy too literally. Though this Article ultimately
concludes that the bail-bond industry’s “wall of authority” argument is formally and
rhetorically illegitimate, we do not advocate Rule 11 sanctions for lawyers champi-
oning the wall argument. Not at all. This is because this Article analyzes formal and
rhetorical legitimacy in abstract constitutional doctrine. On the other hand, Rule 11
analyzes potential transgressions of norms of litigation. Adjudicative context always
guides a Rule 11 inquiry; this context inevitably includes complicated facts and
adversarial relationships. In the rough-and-tumble world of litigation, even highly
dubious legal assertions are easily forgiven. Yet, stricter standards apply when
assessing pure doctrinal questions outside of litigation. An argument regarded as
perfectly “within bounds” in the litigation game may nonetheless transgress the
academic norms of our law-review game.39
B. Legitimacy in Constitutional Argument
Based on the formal and rhetorical senses of argument legitimacy discussed
above, we propose two general frameworks to assess constitutional arguments. First,
some additional theoretical background is necessary.
Legal scholars have previously categorized different types of arguments ac-
cepted as legitimate within constitutional discourse.40 The most enduring typology
consensus, even unspoken, to preserve them. . . . Norms [can] erode, slowly, amid argument
and equivocation about the significance of a breach, until they’ve been destroyed.”).
36 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c).
37 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
38 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
39 Of course, professors often hope to influence the courts, and academic debate on law
does occasionally affect litigation outcomes. The inverse is more routinely true—court
debate inspires academic argument. Yet, though academic and litigation discourses intersect,
they nonetheless differ.
40 See, e.g., Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1348.
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comes from Philip Bobbitt.41 Over thirty years ago, Bobbitt introduced the concept
of “constitutional modalities” to describe “the ways in which legal propositions are
characterized as true from a constitutional point of view.”42 Bobbitt identified six
modalities of constitutional argument as legitimate: textual (appeals to the meanings
of words and phrases in the Constitution), historical (appeals to the intentions of
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution), structural (appeals to rules based on the
relationships between constitutional actors and agents), doctrinal (appeals to prece-
dent), prudential (appeals based on pragmatic policy concerns), and ethical (appeals
based on shared constitutional values).43
Though some debate persists, subsequent scholars have largely accepted Bobbitt’s
basic types of legitimate argument.44 If a given argument for interpreting constitu-
tional meaning does not fall into one (or more) of his accepted modalities, it will be
rejected out of hand by advocates, judges, and theorists alike. As Bobbitt puts it:
“One does not see counsel argue, nor a judge purport to base his decision, on
arguments of kinship. . . . Nor does one hear overt religious arguments or appeals to
let the matter be decided by chance or reading entrails.”45 Arguments rooted in kin-
ship, religion, chance, or by reading entrails may be formally or rhetorically legiti-
mate in other discourses, but in constitutional law, they are not. Constitutional norms
only admit arguments about text, history, structure, doctrine, policy, or values.46
While Bobbitt’s modalities provide a good starting point for our framework,
they cannot stand alone. This is because inclusion in Bobbitt’s typology only
qualifies as a necessary condition for constitutional argument legitimacy—not a
41 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE]; PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Philip
Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989) (book review). Richard Fallon’s very
similar typology has also endured. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence
Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).
42 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 41, at 12.
43 See id. at 12–13.
44 See Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1348 n.1 (describing
Bobbitt’s enduring influence); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 460 (2013) (a recent citation to Bobbitt’s typology,
confirming its enduring influence). Jamal Greene has recently developed a rhetorical frame-
work for understanding constitutional argument that also directly builds on Bobbitt’s typology.
See generally Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1389 (2013). It should be noted, however, that Greene only recognizes five (rather than six)
legitimate argument types. See id. at 1443. On Greene’s account, Bobbitt’s “ethical” category
of constitutional values should not be viewed as a legitimate subject, but rather as a mode of
persuasion. Id. at 1443–45. However, for reasons set out in depth in prior work, the category
of “value” argument deserves recognition as a legitimate subject. See Starger, Constitutional
Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1363–71.
45 BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 41, at 6.
46 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 41, at 12–13.
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sufficient one. In other words, one can make illegitimate arguments based on text,
history, or any of the other categories. Consider this proposition: “The Constitution
prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquors.”47 An argument for the proposition might
appeal to the plain text of the Eighteenth Amendment.48 Yet, despite proceeding
through the textual modality, such an argument would be universally rejected as
invalid and thus formally illegitimate.49 The rules of the game simply do not permit
analysis of isolated constitutional text independent of context (i.e., a subsequent
Amendment repealing prohibition). Appealing to text thus does not per se confer
legitimacy. One can also imagine similarly invalid arguments based on Bobbitt’s
five other types.50
What then, beyond inclusion in Bobbitt’s typology, makes a constitutional argu-
ment legitimate? The short answer is: legitimacy requires coherent justification of
the asserted proposition. This builds on scholars’ previous insight that Bobbitt’s types
of modalities describe only the subject-matter content of constitutional argument—not
the rhetorical mode of proof employed to justify statements of constitutional mean-
ing.51 An argument about a legitimate subject matter will become illegitimate if not
justified by plausible and credible proof.
With this groundwork in place, we can now state our proposed framework for
formal legitimacy in constitutional argument:
To be formally legitimate, constitutional arguments must (a) state
a proposition about constitutional meaning that is (b) justified by
plausible reasoning or credible authority that analyzes or discus-
ses (c) one or more legitimate subject of constitutional argument.
We examine each part of the framework in turn.
Part (a) requires that the argument under review state a proposition about
constitutional meaning. This ensures focus on abstract questions of constitutional
law rather than on the equities of any concrete controversy. In adjudicative contexts,
courts ultimately evaluate whether litigants win or lose lawsuits.52 Arguments
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (prohibiting the “manufacture, sale, or trans-
portation of intoxicating liquors” within the United States).
48 See id.
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment).
50 For example, an argument in favor of the proposition “the Constitution prohibits trade
with England” might appeal to history—the Framers fought a revolution to break the English
yoke. All serious participants in constitutional discourse would recognize this as an invalid
argument in favor of that proposition. Without breaking a sweat, one could also come up with
formally illegitimate arguments based on structure, doctrine, etc.
51 This insight forms the crux of Professor Jamal Greene’s recent critique of Bobbitt. See
Greene, supra note 44, at 1443 (introducing a comparison chart profiling Bobbitt’s modalities);
see also Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1358–62 (discussing and
refining distinctions developed by Professor Greene).
52 Above all, judges must decide the case. This is the “judgment imperative.” See Starger,
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justifying judgment may appeal directly to facts-on-the-ground without defending
a specific proposition about constitutional meaning.53 Though such arguments are
legitimate in litigation, they are formally illegitimate under the framework.54
Part (b) works in conjunction with part (c) to capture the necessary relationship
between “coherent justification” and “legitimate subject matter” described above. “Le-
gitimate subjects” are simply those named in Bobbitt’s typology.55 “Coherent jus-
tification” refers to proof by reason or proof by authority. For over two thousand years,
rhetoricians have recognized appeals to reason (logos) or appeals to authority (ethos)
as the primary modes of rational proof.56 Legitimate argument about constitutional
propositions must also be warranted by one of these rational modes.57 Constitutional
propositions not justified by dint of reason or authority are formally illegitimate.
More than this, constitutional arguments backed by flawed appeals to reason or au-
thority are also illegitimate. Part (b) of the framework therefore requires “coherent”
justification, achieved through “plausible” reasoning or “credible” authority.58
Such is this Article’s general framework for assessing formal legitimacy. Quite
obviously, a lot rides on what counts as “plausible” reasoning or “credible” authority.
Note that the framework does not further provide a metric for assessing plausibility
or credibility; it is no self-executing test or deterministic formula. This underscores
Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1355 n.41 (citing CHA¯M PERELMAN &
L. OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON ARGUMENTATION 131 (John
Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver trans., 1969)).
53 Such appeals “bypass ordinary propositional argument by directly ‘manipulat[ing] the
reader’s emotions in order to persuade her as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome.’” Id. at
1356 (alteration in original) (quoting Greene, supra note 44, at 1394); see also id. at 1357
(“Propositions are necessary for legitimacy.”).
54 As noted above, this framework assesses academic rather than litigation legitimacy. See
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
55 See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE, supra note 41, at 7.
56 See generally Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 1353–54. Of
course, the ancients recognized three types of rhetorical proof—logos, ethos, and pathos.
Arguments based on pathos (“pathetic arguments”) appeal to emotion rather than reason or
authority. Id. Though appeals to pathos may be legitimate in the context of adjudication, purely
emotional argument untethered to reason or authority do not pass academic muster. Cf. id.
at 1357–58 (standing alone, arguments based on pathos are illegitimate).
57 “Warranted” is often used as a synonym for “justified.” See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)
(requiring that legal contentions be “warranted by existing law”). Argument theorist Stephen
Toulmin, however, famously used the word “warrant” to describe the major premise of an
argument as distinct from “backing,” which he used to describe the concept of justification.
See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 29, at 1083 n.194 (discussing TOULMIN, supra
note 25, at 87–105). Regardless of words used, the point remains that formal legitimacy re-
quires propositions about constitutional meaning be “grounded,” “backed,” or “justified” by
reasons or authority.
58 Coherence is the fundamental quality of rationality in discourse. See Starger, DNA of an
Argument, supra note 29, at 1092 (“Coherence . . . describes whether collections of concepts—
sets of ideas, words, propositions, and the like—‘hang together’ or ‘make sense’ as a whole.”).
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an important point. In hard constitutional cases, coherent/plausible/credible argu-
ments may exist on both sides.59 Although formal legitimacy concerns “correctness,”
the framework does not assume a single correct answer exists to any constitutional
question.60 Instead, formal legitimacy represents a minimum requirement—a
discursive floor—for an argument to win “by the rules.”
Our proposed framework for rhetorical legitimacy in constitutional argument
builds directly on its formal counterpart. Given its especially fluid and imprecise
nature, rhetorical legitimacy is best framed in the negative:
To be rhetorically illegitimate, constitutional arguments must (a)
not qualify as formally legitimate; and (b) transgress accepted
norms of constitutional discourse.
If pushed for an affirmative version of this framework, we might offer a fuzzy
schematic: rhetorical legitimacy = formal legitimacy + normative wiggle room.
The fuzziness of the rhetorical inquiry is a feature, not a bug. Analysis of rhetori-
cal legitimacy cannot proceed as a mechanistic affair. Proving an argument formally
illegitimate under the framework should be hard—after all, conflicting arguments
can be formally legitimate so long as they are plausible. Proving an argument rhetori-
cally illegitimate should be harder.
C. Legitimate and Illegitimate Ipse Dixit Argument
Ipse dixit, Latin for “he himself said it,” is often used as a pejorative term to
dismiss arguments.61 However, ipse dixit argumentation is not inherently invalid in
legal argument.62 Formal legitimacy depends on the type of proposition asserted and
the type of justification accepted by the specific legal discourse.
59 What’s more, the case need not be “hard” to have contradictory arguments that are for-
mally legitimate. Indeed, almost any Supreme Court constitutional case involving a dissent
will feature dueling formally coherent positions.
60 It may well be, for example, that a plausible textual analysis points in one direction and
a plausible historical analysis points in another. Constitutional argument types are thus said
to be “incommensurable.” See Fallon, supra note 41, at 1191. In such cases, judges often turn
to internal norms to break a formal tie. Cf. id. at 1207 (“Confronted with contending theoretical
arguments that are equally or nearly equally plausible, judges prefer those that accord with
their views of justice or sound policy.”).
61 See Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW, supra note 17 (defining ipse dixit); see also, e.g., Bond
v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2098 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“Petitioner
and her amici press us to consider whether there is anything to this ipse dixit. The Consti-
tution’s text and structure show that there is not.”).
62 See, e.g., Nat’l Tire Dealers & Retreaders Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 40 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (implying that the court can accept a “statement of [ ] reasons” on “mere ipse dixit” if the
statement is “inherently plausible”). We also maintain that justification through ipse dixit
“plausible reasoning” is formally legitimate.
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Our framework for formal legitimacy in constitutional argument distinguishes
between proof by “plausible reasoning” and proof by “credible authority.” Some
subjects of constitutional argument require proof by authority.63 Where a proposition
about constitutional meaning requires justification by credible authority, ipse dixit
statements are formally invalid. On the other hand, if a constitutional proposition can
be justified by plausible reasoning, then ipse dixit arguments may be formally valid.
Hypotheticals help demonstrate the operative distinctions. First imagine a dis-
pute between Spencer and Issa over whether the Constitution allows for the death
penalty. Spencer maintains that the Fifth Amendment supports his view that the
Constitution permits executions. He argues that the Amendment’s phrase “[n]o per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless . . .”64 necessarily contem-
plates holding persons to answer for “capital” crimes when the “unless” conditions
are met. Spencer cites no authority for this argument. Yet standing alone, his ipse
dixit assertion meets the criteria from our general framework and qualifies as a
formally legitimate argument.
Specifically, Spencer (a) states a proposition about constitutional meaning (the
Fifth Amendment allows capital punishment) that is (b) justified by plausible
reasoning (implication of an unless condition) that analyzes (c) a legitimate subject
of constitutional argument (plain text of the document). Spencer need not cite
authority for such analysis. Reason alone suffices—he himself can say it.
Now Issa offers a competing argument. She maintains that the Eighth Amend-
ment supports her view that the Constitution prohibits capital punishment. She
argues (i) that the “unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment65
includes punishments that have become rare; and (ii) capital punishment has become
rare. For proposition (i), Issa cites no authority. For proposition (ii), she cites sta-
tistics on the death penalty’s decline.
Proposition (i) is supported by a formally legitimate ipse dixit argument. Like
Spencer, Issa has engaged in plausible reasoning (unusual means rare) about consti-
tutional text. Since proposition (ii) is supported by authority, it is not an ipse dixit
argument. Whether the death penalty has declined is an empirical question requiring
empirical authority. She herself just can’t make up statistics. Had Issa not cited au-
thority, hers would have been a formally illegitimate ipse dixit argument.
Of course, a real debate over capital punishment’s constitutionality would
involve many more than just Spencer and Issa’s imagined conflicting arguments.
Real-world disputants would attack and defend on many fronts, invoking a whole
suite of arguments to simultaneously advance their position and to undermine the
legitimacy of their opponents’ positions. The point here is theoretical. Formally
63 Propositions of constitutional meaning based on appeals to precedent inherently require
justification by citation to authority. Propositions of constitutional meaning based on plain text,
on the other hand, do not. By definition, plain meaning analysis rests on ordinary understanding
rather than special authority.
64 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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legitimate ipse dixit constitutional arguments are possible, they can involve plausible
readings of plain text, and they can exist on both sides of a dispute.
Now let us consider ipse dixit dynamics in a hypothetical appeal to precedent.
Imagine two colleagues—call them Mr. White and Jesse—are arguing over whether
the Constitution guarantees the right to manufacture crystal methamphetamine (aka
“crank” or “ice”). Mr. White maintains that it does. Mr. White justifies his claim
based on Supreme Court precedent that, he says, stands for the proposition that
states may run their own laboratories for making ice. When Jesse shoots Mr. White
a skeptical look, Mr. White responds: “Just check out Justice Brandeis’s opinion in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.66 It’s all there Jesse, I’m telling you.”
Jesse dutifully looks up the case. He finds the passage Mr. White apparently
relies upon. It reads:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.67
Jesse nods sadly. He accuses Mr. White of making a formally illegitimate ipse
dixit argument.
Jesse is right. Mr. White does assert a proposition about constitutional meaning
(that it grants the right to make meth), and he does ground his argument in a legitimate
subject (precedent). Yet Mr. White’s reading of Brandeis in New Ice is entirely im-
plausible. Mr. White just says the case stands for his preferred proposition. Because
there is no textual basis for his claim—stray references to experiments, labs, and ice
notwithstanding—Mr. White’s reading of Brandeis is formally illegitimate ipse dixit.68
While this hypothetical is outlandish, the type of error it illustrates is all too com-
mon. Entirely misstating what a case stands for, and then using that misstatement to
prove a proposition about constitutional meaning, is a formally illegitimate ipse dixit
argument. And it is precisely the kind of argument that stands at the back of the bail-
bond industry’s claim that a “wall of authority” rejects the right to affordable bail.69
II. EXCESSIVE BAIL AND AN ILLEGITIMATE WALL
Bail reform efforts have gathered serious momentum over the past year as juris-
dictions around the country have moved to limit or end money bail practices.70 In
66 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 311.
68 See id.
69 See infra Section II.B.
70 This Article was written in the Summer of 2017. For a survey of current reform efforts
and bail-bond industry opposition to it, see generally COLOR OF CHANGE & ACLU’S CAMPAIGN
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response to this perceived attack on its livelihood, the bail-bond industry has aggres-
sively opposed reform in courts and legislatures.71 This is the larger context for the
specifically constitutional arguments raised by Paul Clement before the Maryland
Court of Appeals, as described in this Article’s Introduction.72 Though they included
some Maryland-specific analysis,73 Clement’s arguments on affordable bail are
typical and representative of the national debate.74 The bail debate, like other socially
polarizing issues, does not occur in a vacuum. As the role of money bail evolves, so
too do the arguments of the bail-bond industry.75
FOR SMART JUSTICE, $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM: HOW INSURANCE CORPORATIONS HAVE
TAKEN OVER OUR BAIL SYSTEM (2017), https://www.aclu.org/report/selling-our-freedom
-how-insurance-corporations-have-taken-over-our-bail-system [https://perma.cc/7H37-EF7Q]
[hereinafter $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM] (explaining how the bail-bond industry works, who
is behind it, and who is impacted by it).
71 See, e.g., Duane “Dog” Chapman & Beth Chapman Take Fight to Protect Crime Victims
and Save Bail Industry to Georgia, OFFICIAL DOG NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.official
dognews.com/2017/02/22/duane-dog-chapman-beth-chapman-take-fight-to-protect-crime-vic
tims-and-save-bail-industry-to-georgia/ [https://perma.cc/P45V-AN88] (characterizing—on
a bail-bond website—reform efforts as “an all-out assault by the criminal lobby to change
a 200 year old practice of cash bail”).
72 See supra Introduction.
73 The Clement Memo cites to an old Maryland appellate case for the proposition that,
under Maryland law, “[t]he question of excessive bail is not resolved on the basis of an in-
dividual’s ability or inability to raise a certain sum.” Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting
Simmons v. Warden of Balt. City Jail, 298 A.2d 199, 200 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973)). Although
Maryland law is not a focus of this Article, two problems with this authority deserve mention.
First, the Simmons case offers no analysis to justify its conclusion and thus appears to be clas-
sic illegitimate ipse dixit. Second, to the extent that Simmons can be read to rely on an earlier
case called Bigley, see Simmons, 298 A.2d at 200 (citing Bigley v. Warden, Md. Corr. Inst.
for Women, 294 A.2d 141 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972)), it bears emphasis that both Simmons
and Bigley concerned appeals from denial of supersedeas bonds—bonds providing for release
after conviction while an appeal is pending. Of course, one who is detained pretrial while
presumed innocent has a significantly greater liberty interest than one who has been con-
victed in a court of law and now seeks appeal. Conclusory reasoning about supersedeas
bonds in the appeal context should have no bearing on the pretrial constitutional issue.
74 See, e.g., Pugh I, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated en banc on other grounds,
572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978); Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2017
WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017). These cases are further discussed infra notes 174–97
and accompanying text.
75 Interestingly, several bail-bond companies across the country have lobbied aggres-
sively against bail reform efforts by arguing that defendants accused of crimes and released
on non-monetary conditions are being robbed of their constitutionally protected right to bail.
Of course, as courts have surmised, this sudden interest in championing the rights of the crimi-
nally accused is economically influenced; the less money bail is used, the less commercial bail
industries are employed. See generally Holland v. Rosen, No. 17-4317 (JBS-KMW), 2017 WL
4180003, at *27–30 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2017) (holding that releasing a defendant on non-monetary
conditions of home detention and a GPS anklet, instead of money bail, neither infringed upon
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Analysis of the constitutional status of affordable bail begins with the text of the
Eighth Amendment, which contains the Constitution’s only reference to bail.76 The
Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”77 This deceptively simple text
underdetermines the constitutional command on bail. Everything turns on “exces-
sive”—and nowhere within the four corners of the document is the meaning of this
word defined, discussed, or otherwise elaborated.78 Given this, it comes as no
surprise that precedent plays an outsized role in understanding what “excessive”
does and does not mean.
According to Paul Clement, on behalf of the bail-bond industry, the specific
proposition supported by a “wall of authority” is this: Bail is not excessive merely
because the defendant is unable to pay it.79 This Part demonstrates how Clement’s
claim about authority supporting this proposition is formally illegitimate as a matter
of constitutional argument.
Section A begins by revealing the so-called wall to be a hollow echo cham-
ber—courts adopting the key proposition did so solely on the authority of prior
courts echoing the same proposition based on prior authority tracing back in a chain
to an Eighth Circuit case decided in 1964 called White v. United States.80 Section B
shows how White justified its assertion of the proposition by an implausible reading
of prior precedent. White’s argument is thus formally illegitimate, rendering the
cases relying on it the fruits of an illegitimate tree. Finally, Section C offers an
independent argument for finding the wall of cases formally illegitimate en masse.
All the cases in Clement’s wall came before the Supreme Court authorized pretrial
detention on the grounds of dangerousness in United States v. Salerno.81 After
Salerno, the prior practice of setting an unaffordable bail just to detain dangerous
people was no longer necessary or legitimate.82
the Eighth Amendment nor violated due process); Collins v. Daniel, No. 1:17-CV-00776-RJ
(D.N.M. Sept. 7, 2017) (Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction).
76 See U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
77 Id. Ratified in 1789, the Eighth Amendment is modelled after similar phrasing in the
English Bill of Rights. See ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th
_century/england.asp [https://perma.cc/UJY7-7U46] (“That excessive bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted[.]”).
78 Of course, underdetermined text is not a constitutional feature unique to bail. The
Eighth Amendment itself prohibits “excessive” fines and “cruel and unusual” punishments
without further specifying their meaning. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Likewise, constitutional
text alone will not answer what makes process “due” or searches and seizures “unreason-
able.” See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV.
79 Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (citations omitted).
80 330 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1964).
81 481 U.S. 739, 750–51 (1987) (holding that a defendant may be detained without bail
pretrial only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence that he is dangerous).
82 See id.
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A. Mapping the Wall
The Clement Memo justifies the claim that “bail is not excessive merely because
the defendant is unable to pay it” based on a citation to six cases.83 Internal support
for that same proposition within those six cases in turn derives from citations to
other cases. The resulting citation network is visualized in Figure 1.84
Figure 185
83 Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (quoting Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679,
687 (8th Cir. 1966) and citing United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988);
United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886, 891 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d
85, 86 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1070 (4th Cir. 1973); White v.
Wilson, 399 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1968)).
84 In chronological order, the full citations to the cases shown in Figure 1: Stack v. Boyle,
342 U.S. 1 (1951); Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1953); White v. United States,
330 F.2d 811 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 855 (1964); United States v. Radford, 361
F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1966); Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d
679 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967); White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596 (9th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Beaman,
631 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982); United
States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988).
85 To access the interactive version of Figure 1 and Figure 2, please visit http://wm.billof
rightsjournal.org/?page_id=525 or the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal website at http://
wm.billofrightsjournal.org/, click on the Digital Supplements tab, and then “Affordable Bail.”
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Here is how to read this “doctrinal map”86: Circles and triangles represent cases
and the star represents the Clement Memo. Arrows pointing back from cases or the
memo represent citations. The Clement Memo brief directly cited the cases repre-
sented as light downward-facing triangles for the proposition in question—and those
cases do state that bail is not excessive because the defendant is unable to pay.87 The
light downward-facing triangle cases, in turn, properly cited dark upward-facing
triangle cases (as well as other light down-triangle cases) for the same proposition.
Finally, the circle cases are cited by dark upward-facing triangle cases but they do
not support the proposition. In other words, the circle cases do not state or imply that
bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is unable to pay it.
Though Figure 1 distills the essential line of authority for the key proposition, it
does not purport to show every case cited or citation in the network. Rather, it presents
an accurate schematic picture of the doctrinal relationships. Critically, none of the
downward-facing triangle cases engage in any independent analysis of the proposition.
Instead, the cases all rely exclusively on prior authority to justify the claim. The 1973
case United States v. Wright is typical in this regard.88 In Wright, the court states:
The defendant urges his impecunious financial status as an es-
sential criterion of excessiveness which the Eighth Amendment
forbids. We point out, however, that the governing criterion to
test the excessiveness of bail is not as the defendant suggests,
but whether bail is set at a figure higher than an amount reason-
ably calculated to insure that the accused will stand trial. United
States v. Radford, supra; Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83
(8th Cir. 1953).89
Note how Wright bases its rejection of any relevance to the defendant’s “impecu-
nious financial status” on case law alone.90 That is it—end of analysis. The other
light downward-facing triangle cases resort to the same method.91
86 This doctrinal mapping technique was introduced and developed in earlier work. See gen-
erally Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (2012); Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Prece-
dent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 107–08 (2012).
87 Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6.
88 See 483 F.2d at 1070.
89 Id. (citing Radford, 361 F.2d 777; Forest, 203 F.2d 83).
90 Note too how Wright’s cite to Forest is not shown on the map, but is instead sche-
matically captured by showing its cite to Radford, which in turn cited White, which in turn
(mis)cited Forest for the same proposition. All of the cross-citations would unnecessarily
complicate the visual and therefore were left out.
91 See supra Figure 1. See generally United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d
85 (6th Cir. 1980); Wright, 483 F.2d 1068; White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1968);
Hodgdon v. United States, 365 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1067).
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The key point of the map—and of the citation network it represents—is that all
roads lead to the 1964 White case. This is the first time that a direct statement of the
key proposition emerges in the doctrine. All subsequent cases merely echo White’s
original pronouncement.
B. White Makes an Illegitimate Ipse Dixit Argument
White arises out of an appeal of a federal marijuana conviction.92 Prior to trial,
Chester White had unsuccessfully sought release on his own recognizance.93 Instead,
the trial judge set bail at $5,000—an amount Mr. White could not afford.94 On appeal,
he argued this violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive bail” and
“prevented pretrial freedom necessary to the preparation of his defense.”95
When addressing the propriety of the district court’s setting an unaffordable bail,
the White court began by agreeing that the defendant “was entitled to apply for bail
prior to conviction.”96 After summarizing Mr. White’s contention that bail unaffordable
to an indigent is inherently “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment, the court stated:
No extended discussion . . . is necessary as justification for our
agreement with . . . the District Judge under the circumstances of
this particular case. We simply point out that the governing crite-
rion adopted by this Circuit to test the excessiveness of bail pro-
scribed by Amendment VIII is, not as defendant suggests, but
whether bail is ‘set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably
calculated to insure that the [defendant] will stand trial and submit
to sentence if convicted.’ Forest v. United States, 203 F.2d 83, 84
(8th Cir. 1953). The mere financial inability of the defendant to
post an amount otherwise meeting the aforesaid standard does not
automatically indicate excessiveness. The purpose for bail cannot
in all instances be served by only accommodating the defendant’s
pocketbook and his desire to be free pending possible conviction.97
The court’s logic has two parts. First, it cites Forest as providing the test for exces-
siveness—whether the amount is “reasonably calculated” to ensure appearance at trial.98
Second, it suggests that implicit in the Forest test is the proposition that bail need
not be affordable.99




96 Id. at 814.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 See id. (“The mere financial inability of the defendant to post an amount otherwise meet-
ing the aforesaid standard does not automatically indicate excessiveness.”).
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The argument’s second move—reading the Forest test to reject affordability—is
not independently justified. The court does not engage in any “extended discussion”
(saying none is necessary) of Forest or Supreme Court doctrine.100 Nor does the
White court ground its conclusion about the permissibility of an unaffordable bail
in any other accepted modality like constitutional structure, policy, or so on. Instead,
the proposition about affordability is ipse dixit. For this ipse dixit to be legitimate,
it must be based on a plausible reading of Forest and preceding Supreme Court case
law. Otherwise, it is simply an unjustified assertion tethered to nothing.
A close look at Forest as well as the Supreme Court case Forest relies on (Stack
v. Boyle101) reveals that White’s reading is, in fact, implausible.
Forest concerned a consolidated interlocutory appeal in a federal criminal case
involving four individuals charged under the Smith Act with conspiracy to over-
throw the Government by force and violence.102 Bail was eventually set at $15,000
for Forest and $10,000 for his co-defendants.103 All the alleged conspirators posted
this bail and secured release from custody.104 However, the defendants then moved
for a further reduction in bail, arguing that the amount they had posted was exces-
sive.105 When that motion was denied, the appeal followed.106
The Forest court upheld the district court’s action.107 Citing the Supreme Court’s
language from Stack v. Boyle, the court first observed that “bail is excessive if set
at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to insure that the accused
will stand trial and submit to sentence if convicted.”108 Then comes the kicker. The
court approvingly noted the district court’s endeavors “to arrive at an amount which
the defendant could obtain”—and further praised the trial court for “fix[ing] their
bail at figures which [the District Court Judge] concluded were not unreasonable and
which would enable the defendants to secure their release from custody.”109 The
appeal was only denied because $10,000 to $15,000 was a reasonable amount given
the nature of the charges.110
Based on this, it is manifestly clear that Forest cannot plausibly be read to stand
for the proposition—asserted by the White court—that a defendant’s inability to pay
100 See id. (“No extended discussion of the formula . . . is necessary as justification for our
agreement with the propriety of its application by the District Court Judge under the circum-
stances of this particular case.”).
101 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
102 203 F.2d 83, 83 (8th Cir. 1953).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 83–84.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 83.
107 Id. at 84.
108 Id. (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)).
109 Id. (emphases added).
110 See id. (“The bail required of and given by the defendants is, in our opinion, not so
high as to require a reversal . . . .”).
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does not make a bail excessive. In fact, the Forest defendants made bail and the
reviewing court highlighted the trial court’s efforts to ensure that result.111 Even if
the Forest court’s explicit language falls shy of affirmatively recognizing a right to
affordable bail, there is no plausible way to read the language as rejecting the
possibility. The White court, therefore, pulled that implication from Forest in con-
tradiction of its text and result.
The enormity of the White court’s error becomes even clearer upon examination
of Stack v. Boyle, the Supreme Court case that announced the test for excessive-
ness—whether the “amount [is] reasonably calculated” to ensure that the accused
will stand trial.112 Like Forest, Stack concerned a Smith Act prosecution in which
a defendant sought to reduce bail.113 However, unlike in Forest, the Stack defendant
had failed to secure his release and sought relief by filing a habeas corpus petition.114
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson ultimately held that habeas corpus was
the wrong procedural vehicle and directed the defendant to file a motion to reduce
bail in district court.115
In arriving at this procedural judgment, Chief Justice Vinson offered vital
dicta.116 First, he stressed that the “traditional right to freedom before conviction
permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction
of punishment prior to conviction.”117 Second, he opined that “[u]nless this right to
bail before trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after cen-
turies of struggle, would lose its meaning.”118 Third, Vinson articulated what became
a famous test: “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to
ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amend-
ment.”119 Finally, Vinson criticized the lower court for setting a bail amount without
an individualized, evidence-based inquiry into what was necessary to ensure the
presence of the defendant at trial.120
The overall tenor of these comments assumes that defendants will secure re-
lease.121 Bail is framed as a right necessary to preserve the presumption of innocence
111 See id. at 83–84 (noting that the bail amount could be obtained by the defendants while
still ensuring their appearance at trial).
112 Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (citing United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1926)).
113 Id. at 3.
114 Id. at 3–4.
115 Id. at 6–7 (noting that procedurally, the defendant should have appealed the district
court’s decision to deny his motion to reduce bail before filing a habeas corpus petition).
116 See id. at 4–5.
117 Id. at 4 (citing Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895)).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 5.
120 Id. at 6 (“To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high
amount is an arbitrary act [that] would inject into our own system of government the very
principles of totalitarianism which Congress was seeking to guard against . . . .”).
121 As stated in Justice Jackson’s concurrence:
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and to ensure that defendants are free when preparing for trial.122 High bail amounts
are inherently suspect under the Court’s view unless they represent individualized
judgments about what is necessary to ensure that a released defendant shows up for
trial. Anything higher than what is required to make the defendant show up after
release is excessive.
Nothing in Chief Justice Vinson’s analysis remotely supports the idea that it is
permissible to keep a defendant detained pretrial merely because he is unable to
afford bail. Indeed, the underlying logic of the opinion suggests the opposite. After
all, a poor defendant is cloaked in the same presumption of innocence as a rich
defendant. A poor defendant also shares the same need to prepare her own defense
and claims the same right to not be subject to arbitrary pretrial punishment because
of a high bail amount.
Once again, even if Stack does not unambiguously announce a right to afford-
able bail, there is no way it can be plausibly interpreted to support the proposition that
no such right exists. Yet that is precisely how the White court read Stack and Forest.123
Given the framework outlined in Sections I.B–C, we can now confidently conclude
that White’s statement that the “mere financial inability of the defendant to post [a bail]
does not automatically indicate excessiveness” is formally illegitimate ipse dixit.124
Since White is illegitimate authority for its key proposition, all the cases that cite
White as authority for that proposition are also illegitimate. Without independent
analysis, the subsequent cases are as tainted as the fruit of a poisonous tree.125 The
echo chamber illustrated in Figure 1 merely repeated White’s original sin in the
name of honoring precedent. Clement’s entire “wall of authority” is therefore a
formally illegitimate constitutional argument.
C. En Masse Illegitimacy for Pre-Salerno Cases
Besides its fatal echo-chamber defect, the authority of the “wall” suffers from
another formal flaw rendering it illegitimate. This flaw turns on the change to pretrial
The practice of admission to bail, as it has evolved in Anglo-American
law, is not a device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation
until it is found convenient to give them a trial. On the contrary, the
spirit of the procedure is to enable them to stay out of jail until a trial
has found them guilty.
Id. at 7–8 (Jackson, J., concurring).
122 See id. at 8.
123 See White v. United States, 330 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1964) (“The mere financial in-
ability of the defendant to post an amount otherwise meeting the aforesaid standard does not
automatically indicate excessiveness.”).
124 See id.; supra Sections I.B–C.
125 Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963) (discussing “fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine in the Fourth Amendment context—evidence that “would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police” is considered fruit of the poisonous tree).
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detention doctrine wrought by the seminal 1987 Supreme Court case, United States
v. Salerno.126 Prior to Salerno, it was theoretically illegal to subject a non-capital
defendant to pretrial detention on the grounds of dangerousness—the idea that the
defendant presented such a threat to the community at large that she should not be
freed.127 Yet courts frequently overcame this theoretical barrier in practice through
the fiction of setting impossibly high bails to “ensure appearance at trial.”128 By
authorizing outright pretrial detention, Salerno blew up this fiction and undermined
the legitimacy of earlier cases.
The illicit pre-Salerno practice of securing pretrial detention through out-of-
reach bail bubbles beneath the surface of key “wall” cases. Consider Hodgdon v.
United States,129 the case directly quoted by Clement for the unaffordable bail prop-
osition.130 The defendant was a young man with a history of schizophrenia and other
mental illness; he assaulted a United States Commissioner with a .9 mm handgun
and then shot a United States Deputy Marshal during his arrest.131 In upholding a
bail that the defendant could not pay, the Hodgdon court explicitly noted the defen-
dant’s “unpredictable nature and . . . penchant for carrying firearms” and the violent
nature of his charges.132 These considerations framed the court’s conclusion that
“bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is unable to pay.”133
Under contemporary practice, Mr. Hodgdon would have been detained on the
grounds of dangerousness. Alas, this practice was not constitutional pre-Salerno.134
At that time, the test from Stack still governed—“[b]ail set at a figure higher than
an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial] is
‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”135 The bail amount in Hodgdon clearly
was not set to ensure appearance, but rather to make sure the unstable and violent
126 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
127 Salerno changed this and explicitly authorized pretrial detention so long as due process
is provided. Id. at 751 (“When the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that
an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we
believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from
executing that threat.”).
128 The “ensure appearance at trial” test comes from Stack and remains the only legitimate
purpose for bail consistent with the Eighth Amendment. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5
(1951).
129 365 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1029 (1967).
130 See supra Figure 1; see also Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that “courts have
consistently held that ‘bail is not excessive merely because the defendant is unable to pay it.’”
(quoting Hodgdon, 365 F.2d at 687)).
131 Hodgdon, 365 F.2d at 681–83.
132 Id. at 687.
133 Id.
134 See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text (explaining that Salerno served as a
watershed, making pretrial detention on the grounds of dangerousness permissible).
135 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951)).
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Mr. Hodgdon would not get out and hurt anybody before he faced trial. Facing an
indigency-based appeal, the Hodgdon court simply did not respond by denying
admission to bail outright. Its hands tied by Stack, the court instead rejected a right to
affordable bail.136 The same dilemma infects most137 of the wall’s body of authority.138
Perceived problems of violent crime committed by defendants on pretrial release
led Congress to pass the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (BRA).139 By blessing pretrial
detention solely on the grounds of dangerousness, the BRA represented a major
break from tradition.140 Nonetheless, Salerno upheld the BRA’s constitutionality,
flatly rejecting the argument that the Constitution required all defendants have
access to bail.141 Rather, the Court noted that the Eighth Amendment “has never
136 See Hodgdon, 365 F.2d at 687 (“[B]ail is not excessive merely because the defendant
is unable to pay it.”).
137 Only one case cited in the wall of authority was decided after Salerno. See Clement
Memo, supra note 1, at 6 (citing United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir.
1988)). McConnell actually cited Salerno for the proposition that “bail is excessive under the
eighth amendment when set in an amount greater than that required for reasonable assurance
of the presence of the defendant.” McConnell, 842 F.2d at 107 (footnote omitted) (citing
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739). McConnell also cited “wall” cases for the proposition that bails are
not automatically excessive because a defendant is unable to pay. Id. (citing, inter alia,
United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d
85 (6th Cir. 1980)). At first blush, these cites seem to cut against the idea that Salerno changed
a prior fiction. However, closer examination reveals that the McConnell court explicitly rec-
ognized that provisions of the Bail Reform Act were enacted to prevent the “sub rosa use of
money bond to detain dangerous defendants.” Id. at 108 (citation omitted). Moreover, the de-
fendant, Mr. McConnell, presented an extreme flight risk—he was a rich person (charged with
bank fraud) who had been apprehended after fleeing to Mexico. Id. at 106. There was an evi-
dentiary dispute about what resources he actually had. Id. at 107. Approving a high bail amount
for a rich flight risk should not be read to imply approval of bails unaffordable on the grounds
of indigency.
138 See, e.g., United States v. James, 674 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982) (bail not found excessive
in RICO prosecution of a multimillion-dollar marijuana smuggling operation that operated
for nearly four years); United States v. Wright, 483 F.2d 1068, 1069–70 (4th Cir. 1973) (ap-
proving high bail in a case involving “the largest shipment of cocaine ever seized in the Harbor
of Baltimore”); White v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that bail was not
excessive in a case with charges of deadly-weapon assault with intent to commit murder, where
the defendant had a prior manslaughter conviction).
139 Congress enacted the law to respond to “the alarming problem of crimes committed by
persons on release.” See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983)).
140 See id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“This case brings before the Court for the first
time a statute in which Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may be jailed
indefinitely, pending the trial of allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Gov-
ernment shows to the satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes,
unrelated to the pending charges, at any time in the future.”).
141 See id. at 755 (majority opinion) (holding that “[w]e are unwilling to say that [the Bail
Reform Act of 1984] . . . on its face violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.”).
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been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail
shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.”142 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that “when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a
compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amend-
ment does not require release on bail.”143
Salerno thus clarified two propositions about constitutional meaning. First, no
inherent “right to bail” exists for all criminal cases.144 Second, only when bail is
granted does a “right to non-excessive bail” kick in.145 Whether a “right to afford-
able bail” exists turns exclusively on further inquiry into the second proposition; a
bail denied outright need not be affordable. Put differently, Salerno established that
it is constitutionally acceptable to detain a person pretrial because she is danger-
ous—but it does not authorize setting a deliberately unaffordable bail to achieve the
same detention result. Post-Salerno, bails should only be set to facilitate release of
nondangerous defendants and to genuinely ensure their return to court for trial.
In its “wall of authority” argument, the bail-bond industry obfuscates the impact
of Salerno and elides its distinction between “no right to bail” and “right to non-
excessive bail.” Per the Clement Memo:
[W]here a defendant is a flight risk or poses a substantial threat
to the community, the State is justified in setting a high bail
amount or declining bail altogether. That is the point of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Salerno, which held that federal
defendants who pose a serious risk to the community may con-
stitutionally be detained with no bail at all. . . . So long as the
bail amount is calculated to secure the defendant’s appearance
and protect the public, it is constitutional . . . .146
Despite Clement’s ipse dixit assertion, the point of Salerno had nothing to do with
setting bail amounts to “protect the public.”147 Clement’s argument here falsely
equates “high bail amounts” with “no bail at all” under Salerno.
In the end, the Clement Memo fails in its attempt to resuscitate the pre-Salerno
illicit fiction that used unaffordable bail to control for dangerousness. The pre-
Salerno cases that employed this practice no longer qualify as credible authority.
142 See id. at 754 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952)).
143 Id. at 754–55.
144 See id. at 754 (quoting Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545–46, in support of the argument that
the Eighth Amendment’s Bail Clause does not “accord a right to bail in all cases”).
145 See id. (“The [Eighth Amendment] bail clause . . . merely . . . provide[s] that bail shall
not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.” (quoting Carlson, 342 U.S.
at 545–46)).
146 Clement Memo, supra note 1, at 7.
147 See Salerno, 481 U.S. 739.
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And, interpreting Salerno itself to justify high bails to “protect the public” is implau-
sible. Thus, the claim that a “wall of authority” supports the no-right-to-affordable-bail
proposition rests on either noncredible authority (pre-Salerno cases) or implausible
reasoning about authority (the flawed interpretation of Salerno). Employing the
framework from Part I, the claim is formally illegitimate.
III. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR AN AFFORDABLE BAIL RIGHT
Having established the formal illegitimacy of the idea that precedent endorses
the no-right-to-affordable-bail proposition, we now press the case that the doctrine
is also normatively flawed and rhetorically illegitimate. The crux of the argument
here is that the “wall” cases effectively endorse a two-tiered criminal justice system
that discriminates against the poor in favor of the rich. Such discrimination trans-
gresses fundamental norms of constitutional discourse by running afoul of the
Constitution’s core commitment to equal justice.
For this argument to succeed, we must prove that equal protection applies to the
Eighth Amendment bail context. This may seem a steep hill to climb since Supreme
Court doctrine does not recognize the poor as a “suspect class” under traditional
equal protection analysis.148 However, this Part demonstrates that traditional equal
protection analysis does not govern when it comes to securing the access-to-justice
rights of indigent defendants. As it happens, the Supreme Court has carved out a
special line of cases to deal with the “age-old problem” of “[p]roviding equal justice
for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike.”149
Section A introduces this special line of cases, which begins with the 1956
Griffin v. Illinois decision.150 As will be shown, Griffin drew upon due process and
equal protection to guarantee indigent defendants access to justice—and Court mem-
bers immediately recognized the case’s implication for an affordable bail right.151
Section B examines how Griffin’s equal justice principle evolved. As visualized by
another “doctrinal map,” a long-standing countertradition trumps the illegitimate
“wall” cases and establishes the affordable bail right. Based on this doctrinal survey,
Section C shows why the discrimination against the poor advocated by the “wall”
is normatively and rhetorically illegitimate.
148 See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminali-
zation of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 398 n.269 (2012) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 806 (4th ed. 2012) (“In San Antonio School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court expressly held that poverty is not a suspect classification
and that discrimination against the poor should only receive rational basis review.”)); see
also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (“[T]his Court has held repeatedly that poverty,
standing alone, is not a suspect classification.”).
149 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956).
150 Id.
151 See id. at 28–29 (Burton, J., dissenting) (after declaring that “Illinois is not bound to
make the defendants economically equal before its bar of justice,” Justice Burton’s dissent
asked: “Why fix bail at any reasonable sum if a poor man can’t make it?”).
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A. A Special Line to Protect the Poor: Griffin and Bail
Decided in 1956, Griffin v. Illinois confronted an Illinois law that required crimi-
nal defendants to pay for trial transcripts before they could appeal their convictions.152
In effect, the law was discriminatory—only those wealthy enough to buy a transcript
could appeal their cases.153 Drawing on both equal protection and due process—but
not differentiating between the two154—Justice Black proclaimed on behalf of the
Court that “[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color.”155 Further declaring that “[t]here can be
no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has,” the majority ordered the Illinois courts to provide transcripts or “find other
means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.”156
In reaching its holding, the Griffin Court made a key observation about when
equal protection kicks in. The State of Illinois had argued that since the Constitution
does not guarantee a right to appeal criminal cases, charging defendants to defray
(nonobligatory) appeal expenses was fair.157 The plurality responded that though the
State could deny appeal altogether,
that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review can do
so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants
152 The law actually provided free transcripts for indigents convicted of capital crimes; a
“companion state act” further provided free transcripts for indigents raising constitutional chal-
lenges to their convictions. See id. at 13–15 (plurality opinion) (“The effect is that indigents
may obtain a free transcript to obtain appellate review of constitutional questions but not of
other alleged trial errors such as admissibility and sufficiency of evidence.”).
153 As explained by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion, the State in Griffin “said,
in effect, that the Supreme Court of Illinois can consider alleged errors occurring in a criminal
trial only if the basis for determining whether there were errors is brought before it by a bill
of exceptions and not otherwise. From this it follows that Illinois has decreed that only defen-
dants who can afford to pay for the stenographic minutes of a trial may have trial errors
reviewed on appeal by the Illinois Supreme Court.” Id. at 22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
154 See, e.g., id. at 17 (plurality opinion) (“Both equal protection and due process em-
phasize the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime must, so
far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court.’” (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940))); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,
519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) (“[I]n the Court’s Griffin-line cases, ‘[d]ue process and equal pro-
tection principles converge.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 665 (1983))).
155 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17.
156 Id. at 19, 20.
157 See id. at 18 (“It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all.” (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S.
684, 687–88 (1894))); see also id. at 37 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“But whatever else may be said
of Illinois’ reluctance to expend public funds in perfecting appeals for indigents, it can hardly
be said to be arbitrary.”).
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on account of their poverty. Appellate review has now become
an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating
the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Consequently at all stages
of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
protect persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.158
In other words, although the state need not offer appeals, once it does, the principle
of equal justice kicks in. Rich and poor alike must have equal access to processes
that determine liberty or incarceration.159
This equal-justice principle has obvious relevance to the money bail context since
an indigent’s inability to pay a bond results in incarceration. As it happens, this fact
caught the attention of the Griffin dissenters. Specifically, Justice Burton complained:
Illinois is not bound to make the defendants economically equal
before its bar of justice. . . . Persons charged with crimes stand
before the law with varying degrees of economic and social
advantage. Some can afford better lawyers and better investiga-
tions of their cases. Some can afford bail, some cannot. Why fix
bail at any reasonable sum if a poor man can’t make it?160
Why indeed. Though Justice Burton framed his retort as a critique of the Griffin
result, his rhetoric reveals a logical consequence of Griffin’s holding. Unaffordable
bail seems to violate Griffin’s equal-justice principle.161
This interpretation only seemed further confirmed by Bandy v. United States I
(Bandy I)162 and Bandy v. United States II (Bandy II),163 two Justice Douglas opinions
158 Id. at 18 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
159 Of course, “Griffin’s principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment
is at stake.” M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 111 (discussing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), and
progeny). However, cases where imprisonment is at stake occupy the heart of the Griffin line.
See generally Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 667 (1983) (“[A] State cannot ‘impos[e] a fine
as a sentence and then automatically conver[t] it into a jail term solely because the defendant
is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971))).
160 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 28–29 (Burton, J., dissenting).
161 Though less prophetic in tone, Justice Burton’s dissent functions in a similar way to
Justice Scalia’s famous dissent in Windsor. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675,
2710 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening
and waiting for the other shoe.”). Famously, Justice Scalia’s scathing critique became a self-
fulfilling prophesy when Obergefell recognized a state right to same-sex marriage. See
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); see also Garrett Epps, The Twilight of Antonin
Scalia, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/the
-twilight-of-antonin-scalia/378884/ [https://perma.cc/FNG5-PAED].
162 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1960).
163 82 S. Ct. 11 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1961).
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handed down in 1960 and 1961.164 In both cases, Justice Douglas acted as a Circuit
Court judge deciding Mr. Bandy’s application for bail made as direct appellate
litigation proceeded in front of the Supreme Court.165 While Justice Douglas twice
denied the application on technical procedural grounds, he nonetheless opined on
the affordability question in thoughtful dicta.166
In Bandy I, Justice Douglas observed that “to demand a substantial bond which the
defendant is unable to secure raises considerable problems for the equal administration
of the law.”167 He then discussed constitutional and practical problems. Constitutionally,
he cited Griffin for the proposition that denial of an indigent defendant’s appeal vio-
lates equal protection and Stack for the proposition that excessive bail cannot be used
to deny freedom.168 Practically, he noted that pretrial incarceration hampers the prepara-
tion of a defense or the ability to earn money to pay a lawyer.169 Justice Douglas
asked dramatically: “Can an indigent be denied freedom, where a wealthy man would
not, because he does not happen to have enough property to pledge for his freedom?”170
In Bandy II, Justice Douglas decided to answer this question. After quoting five
full paragraphs from Bandy I, he pronounced:
Further reflection has led me to conclude that no man should be
denied release because of indigence. Instead, under our constitu-
tional system, a man is entitled to be released on “personal recog-
nizance” where other relevant factors make it reasonable to
believe that he will comply with the orders of the Court.171
Once again, Justice Douglas came to this conclusion based on principles of equal
justice and the inexorable logic of Griffin and Stack. Though Justice Douglas’s
164 See Bandy I, 81 S. Ct. 197; Bandy II, 82 S. Ct. 11. 
165 Justice Douglas was assigned to the Eighth Circuit and Bandy I was decided pendant
to the Supreme Court’s disposition of Mr. Bandy’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Eighth
Circuit. The full Court remanded Mr. Bandy’s case back to the Circuit. Bandy v. United
States, 364 U.S. 477 (1960) (per curiam). Bandy II was a subsequent application for release
on recognizance made while the Eighth Circuit’s decision on remand was still pending. 82 S.
Ct. at 12.
166 In Bandy I, Justice Douglas essentially found the application moot in light of the main
case’s remand. See 81 S. Ct. at 198 (“I do not reach a decision on the matter. The Court today
holds that the Court of Appeals should hear the appeal.”). In Bandy II, he noted that the ques-
tion of “whether or not a single Justice or Circuit Justice ha[s] the power to fix bail pending
disposition of a petition for certiorari” had not been decided and he declined to get ahead of the
Court while acting alone. 82 S. Ct. at 13.
167 81 S. Ct. at 197.
168 Id. at 197–98 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S.
1 (1951)).
169 Id. at 198.
170 Id.
171 Bandy II, 82 S. Ct. at 13.
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analysis is non-binding under accepted rules of precedent, it does provide persuasive
authority for the proposition that unaffordable money bail violates the Constitution.
Contemporary academic commentators recognized this implication of Justice
Douglas’s Bandy reasoning.172 Of course, it must be admitted that in the fifty-seven
years since Bandy II, the Supreme Court has not applied Griffin to interpret the
Excessive Bail Clause. At the same time, neither has the Court disavowed the pos-
sibility. The question thus remains unanswered at the highest level. However, as
previously shown in Part II, the lower court precedent that rejects the affordable bail
right is formally illegitimate.173 Now we turn to the competing doctrinal tradition that
grounds this right: the legitimate progeny of Stack and Griffin.
B. Legitimate Progeny of Stack and Griffin
Figure 2
172 See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: II, 113 U. PA. L. REV.
1125, 1153 (1965) (“[T]he principle authority to date for the proposition that Griffin might have
application in the bail field is a pair of dicta of Mr. Justice Douglas in the Bandy case.”); Alan
R. Sachs, Indigent Court Costs and Bail: Charge Them to Equal Protection, 27 MD. L. REV.
154, 166 (1967) (“The best indication to date that the Griffin rule might apply in the field of bail
is the dictum expounded by Mr. Justice Douglas while serving as circuit justice in the cases of
Bandy v. United States.”).
173 See supra Part II (concluding that the “wall of authority” is based on either noncredible
authority (pre-Salerno cases) or an “implausible” reading of Salerno).
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Figure 2 shows existing federal authority warranting recognition of the afford-
able bail right. Once again, triangles represent cases and arrows pointing back from
triangles represent citations. The Griffin line of Supreme Court cases are dark-
upward-facing triangles. While dark up-triangle cases do not directly concern bail,
they prohibit incarceration of indigents solely because of their poverty and affirm
the equal-justice principle. Light up-triangle cases explicitly embrace affordable
bail. The single circle case is neutral on the affordability question but completes the
doctrinal picture. Our focus is on the light up-triangle cases, the line proceeding
from Stack and Bandy II.
The earliest case not already discussed in this line is the critical 1977 Fifth Circuit
opinion—Pugh v. Rainwater (Pugh I ).174 This decision arose from a 1971 class-
action lawsuit where plaintiffs sought to enjoin two Florida practices: “(1) pretrial
detention of arrestees without a judicial determination of probable cause, and (2)
pretrial detention of indigent defendants solely because they were unable to post
money bail as a condition of release.”175 The claims were bifurcated and litigation
on the first claim ultimately led to the landmark 1975 Supreme Court decision
Gerstein v. Pugh, which held that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determi-
nation of probable cause as a prerequisite to [detention].”176 Litigation on the second
claim culminated in Pugh I and Pugh II.177
The unanimous panel in Pugh I found that the Florida Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure regarding bail invidiously discriminated against indigent defendants.178 Drawing
on the equal justice framework of Griffin and its successor cases Williams v. Illinois179
and Tate v. Short,180 the panel held “money bail may never be imposed on an indi-
gent defendant.”181 Summing up its moral and doctrinal analysis, the court stated
“equal protection standards require a presumption against money bail and in favor of
those forms of release which do not condition pretrial freedom on an ability to pay.”182
In arriving at this conclusion, the court initially noted that the case did not involve
the “right to bail per se.”183 Since Florida guaranteed bail to its citizens in all non-
capital cases, the issue became whether there existed “invidious[ ] discriminati[on]”
174 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977) (Pugh I), vacated en banc on other grounds, 572 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (Pugh II).
175 Id. at 1193.
176 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
177 See Pugh I, 557 F.2d at 1193–94 (describing Pugh I’s procedural history); see also
Pugh II, 572 F.2d at 1059 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (describing panel’s conclusion in prede-
cessor case, Pugh I).
178 See Pugh I, 557 F.2d at 1193 n.11 (describing FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.130); see also id. at 1202
(“Florida’s current bail system discriminates invidiously against indigents charged with crime.”).
179 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
180 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
181 Pugh I, 557 F.2d at 1202.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 1194.
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in the administration of the “right . . . conferred.”184 Of course, this perfectly tracks
Griffin’s analysis of when the equal-justice principle kicks in.185 The Pugh I court
then noted how even though the Supreme Court had not recognized wealth as a “sus-
pect criterion,” it was “extremely sensitive” to wealth-based classifications “in the
context of criminal prosecutions,” as shown by Williams and Tate.186 Specifically, Tate
“extended” the equal-justice principle to the “situation where the amount of money a
man has determines whether he is imprisoned for an offense.”187 Based on Tate, the
Pugh I court deemed that strict scrutiny of Florida’s bail system was appropriate.188
Pugh I was formally vacated a year later by Pugh II, which held that the panel’s
decision was moot because of an intervening amendment to the rules.189 However,
the en banc court largely embraced and echoed the panel’s moral as well as constitu-
tional analysis.190 For example, the majority announced “[a]t the outset,” that it
“accept[ed] the principle that imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invid-
ious discrimination and not constitutionally permissible.”191 Furthermore, the majority
stated that it “ha[d] no doubt that in the case of an indigent, whose appearance at trial
could reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release, pretrial con-
finement for inability to post money bail would constitute imposition of an excessive
restraint.”192 These statements show that Pugh II embraces, rather than rejects, the right
to affordable bail.193 It is only because Pugh II ultimately shut down the Florida class-
action lawsuit on fact-intensive grounds that it is represented as a circle in Figure 2.
The final two light up-triangles on Figure 2 represent federal district court de-
cisions in ongoing court battles. Money bail systems in states across the nation are
the subject of intense public attention and widespread litigation.194 For example,
184 Id.
185 See discussion supra Part II.
186 Pugh I, 557 F.2d at 1196. To make this point, the court quoted Chief Justice Burger’s
observation from Williams that “the passage of time has heightened rather than weakened the
attempts to mitigate the disparate treatment of indigents in the criminal process.” Id. at 1197
(quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970)).
187 Id. (“[T]he Constitution prohibits a State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then
automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot
forthwith pay the fine in full.” (alteration in original) (quoting Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398
(1971)).
188 Id.
189 Pugh II, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058–59 (5th Cir. 1978); see also O’Donnell v. Harris County,
251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1071 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (“The en banc court vacated as moot the panel
decision finding the system unconstitutional, because Florida had amended its rules while
the appeal was pending.”).
190 See Pugh II, 572 F.2d at 1056.
191 Id. (citing Williams, 399 U.S. 235; Tate, 401 U.S. 395).
192 Id. at 1058.
193 The difference with the panel decision was between the facts-on-the-ground and what
the Florida system actually did or did not do.
194 See Ending American Money Bail, EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., http://www.equaljustice
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Walker v. City of Calhoun195 arises from a challenge to the practice of the City of
Calhoun, Georgia, of using a bail schedule to condition pretrial release on predeter-
mined money amounts linked to the charged offense.196 While Calhoun, Georgia,
still employs a bail schedule, its form has slightly changed in light of pending litiga-
tion.197 O’Donnell v. Harris County198 arises from a challenge to the misdemeanor
bail system of Harris County, Texas.199 Both lawsuits assert that indigents are uncon-
stitutionally incarcerated pretrial because of their inability to afford money bail.200
And, district courts in both cases issued preliminary injunctions on the grounds that jail-
ing indigents solely on account of their poverty violates the Fourteenth Amendment.201
As shown in Figure 2, the precedent relied upon by these courts to justify their
injunctions is familiar. The primary authority relied upon is the Griffin line. In
addition to the cases already discussed, Walker and O’Donnell both invoke Bearden
underlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-system/ [https://perma.cc
/N4VE-3V7N] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
195 No. 4:15-CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016).
196 See id. at *5. The initial injunction in Walker was vacated for lack of specificity. Walker
v. City of Calhoun, 682 Fed. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017). The district court then reinstated
the injunction for the same substantive reasons, using more specific language. Walker v. City
of Calhoun, No. 4:15-cv-0170-HLM, 2017 WL 2794064 (N.D. Ga. June 16, 2017). The case
appeared again on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit. For the purposes of Figure 2, “Walker”
refers to the first substantive decision, which was effectively reinstated. Id. at *2.
197 After the case was filed, but while the suit was still pending, the chief judge of the
city’s municipal court issued a “Standing Order” that required an appearance within forty-
eight hours for all citizens accused of a traffic violation or misdemeanor so that an indigency-
based objection could be made. Walker challenged this new schedule as unconstitutional,
arguing that the forty-eight hour detention was a per se punishment for his indigent status.
The United States Department of Justice recently took an interest in this litigation, filing an
amicus brief in support of neither party and arguing that while the use of bail schedules are
presumptively unconstitutional, a forty-eight hour detention is permissible, drawing an in-
ference between a probable cause determination and an indigency determination. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7–10, 22–26, Walker, 682
Fed. App’x 721 (No. 17-13139-GG).
198 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
199 Id. at 1063–64.
200 See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *3 (“Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Four-
teenth Amendment rights by jailing him because he cannot afford to pay the cash bond.”);
O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (“[A]n order imposing secured money bail is effectively
a pretrial preventive detention order only against those who cannot afford to pay.”). These
lawsuits were both initiated by Civil Rights Corps (formerly Equal Justice Under Law), a
Washington-based public interest legal organization. See Ending Wealth-Based Pretrial Deten-
tion, C.R. CORPS, http://www.civilrightscorps.org/ending-wealth-based-pretrial-detention
[https://perma.cc/PM6R-REM4] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
201 See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *11 (“[A]ny detention based solely on financial status
or ability to pay is impermissible.”); O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1167 (stating that defen-
dants “cannot, consistent with the federal Constitution . . . convert[ ] the inability to pay into
an automatic order of detention without due process and in violation of equal protection.”).
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v. Georgia,202 the most recent case from this line specifically regarding indigent
incarceration.203 The Bearden Court held that jailing a poor defendant for failure to
pay a fine violated the equal-justice principle, unless the defendant “failed to make
sufficient bona fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay.”204 Unsurprisingly,
both district courts also cited the Pugh cases as on-point authority regarding the
unaffordable bail problem.205
As Walker and O’Donnell proceed on appeal, it is possible that their interpreta-
tion of authority will be repudiated by reviewing courts. Yet this does not seem
likely. As the O’Donnell court observed, the Griffin-line cases and Pugh “remain
good law, neither overruled nor limited.”206 Contrary to the assertions of the bail-
bond industry, the weight of federal authority supports the proposition that it is
unconstitutional to imprison legally innocent defendants pretrial solely because of
their inability to afford a bail.207
Bail-bond industry proponents turn a blind eye to this doctrinal tradition or
contest its applicability to the bail context.208 However, it is the fundamental equal-
justice principle underlying the precedent pictured in Figure 2 that ultimately tears
down the “wall of authority” touted by Clement and company as a normative and
rhetorical matter.
C. Discrimination Against the Poor Is Rhetorically Illegitimate
Recall from Part I that rhetorically illegitimate arguments are “out of bounds”
or inappropriate to the discourse.209 Per the framework of Part I, a rhetorically
202 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
203 See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *11 (“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment generally prohibits ‘punishing . . . poverty.’” (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671));
O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1135 (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68).
204 Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
205 See Walker, 2016 WL 361612, at *11 (citing Pugh II); O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at
1136 (citing Pugh I and Pugh II).
206 O’Donnell, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1136–37 (noting that (1) “The Supreme Court in San
Antonio Indep. School District v. Rodriguez specifically excepted Williams and Tate from
the general rule that wealth-classifications are reviewed under a rational basis standard”; (2)
Bearden confirmed this approach; and (3) Pugh applied the Griffin approach to the pretrial
bail context (internal citations omitted)).
207 While our focus is on federal precedent, prominent state authority also supports our
analysis. For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court has noted that “[a] consideration of the
equal protection and due process rights of indigent pretrial detainees leads us to the inescapable
conclusion that a bail system based on monetary bail alone would be unconstitutional.” Lee
v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979) (further noting that the Mississippi system
does allow for non-monetary release conditions).
208 See generally $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM, supra note 70 (explaining how the bail
industry funds lawmakers and lobbyists to keep them embedded in the criminal justice system
and resist change).
209 See discussion supra Section I.A.
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illegitimate constitutional claim must be formally invalid and transgress accepted
norms of constitutional discourse.210 The argument that a wall of authority supports
unaffordable bail is rhetorically illegitimate. Beyond its formal invalidity as shown
in Part II, the wall argument sanctions discrimination against the poor and is as
offensive to contemporary constitutional norms as sanctioning discrimination against
African Americans.
It bears emphasis that the discourse in which this illegitimacy charge is made
is academic or “law review” constitutional discourse. Identifying the formal ipse
dixit flaw in the “wall” argument required a depth of citation tracking and textual
analysis uncommon in ordinary litigation and unrealistic to expect from lawyers
seeking partisan advantage. On the other hand, the normative problem with the bail-
bond industry’s position is much clearer. Regardless of precedent, it offends basic
decency to suggest that equal justice does not apply to pretrial defendants or that it
is perfectly acceptable for poor, legally innocent defendants to languish in jail when
similarly situated rich defendants would enjoy freedom.
Yet lawyers employed by the bail-bond industry must press such morally chal-
lenged arguments precisely because they comport with their clients’ interests. Alas,
the predatory nature of commercial bail practice is notorious and long-lamented.211
In 1964, for example, Judge Skelly Wright opened an opinion passionately appealing
for bail reform with a critique of the practice:
Certainly the professional bondsman system as used in this
District is odious at best. The effect of such a system is that the
professional bondsmen hold the keys to the jail in their pockets.
They determine for whom they will act as surety—who in their
judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen’s judg-
ment, and the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen’s fees,
remain in jail. The court and the commissioner are relegated to
the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of bail.212
Years later, Justice Blackmun echoed Judge Wright when he described “the profes-
sional bail bondsman system with all its abuses . . . in full and odorous bloom.”213 As
Justice Blackmun noted, the traditional system sees bondsmen collect a non-refundable
fee of ten percent of the bond from defendants, which creates “a heavy and irretriev-
able burden . . . upon the accused, to the excellent profit of the bondsman.”214
210 See discussion supra Section I.B.
211 See generally $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM, supra note 70.
212 Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., concurring).
213 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971) (footnote omitted) (describing the Illinois
bail system prior to reform).
214 Id. at 359–60. Writing in dissent in the same case, Justice Douglas was even harsher in
his assessment of the commercial bail bond practice. See id. at 373–74 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
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Though a few jurisdictions have reformed their bail systems to limit commercial
bond practice, the “odious” and “odorous” system unfortunately remains in place
across most of the country.215 In May 2017, for example, the ACLU released a report
documenting how “[c]orporate opportunists have hijacked public authority and cre-
ated an unnecessary and largely unaccountable $2 billion bail industry that profits
from trapping people both inside and out of jail.”216 The ACLU report concludes that
“the bail industry has corrupted our constitutional freedoms for profit.”217 This
conclusion is buttressed by empirical studies of the bond industry218 as well as by
anecdotal tales of its abuse.219 Our over-reliance on money bail has also created a
well-documented trap for poor defendants accused of minor offenses. Years of using
corporate bail companies as a judicial crutch has created huge swaths of individuals
who are incarcerated simply because they cannot obtain a corporate-backed surety
or afford a nominal bond.220
(“The commercial bail bondsman has long been an anathema to the criminal defendant seeking
to exercise his right to pretrial release. . . . Those who [do] not have the resources to post their
own bond [are] at the mercy of the bondsman who [can] exact exorbitant fees and unconscion-
able conditions for acting as surety.” (citation omitted)).
215 See Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29,
2008), https://nyti.ms/2onSW3u (noting that only Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Oregon
prohibit commercial bonds). Liptak’s article stresses how isolated the United States is in coun-
tenancing this practice, as well as how most of the legal profession similarly abhors the
practice. See id. (“Most of the legal establishment, including the American Bar Association
and the National District Attorneys Association, hates the bail bond business, saying it dis-
criminates against poor and middle-class defendants, does nothing for public safety, and usurps
decisions that ought to be made by the justice system.”).
216 See $ELLING OFF OUR FREEDOM, supra note 70, at 1.
217 Id.
218 See, e.g., ARPIT GUPTA ET AL., MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEF., THE HIGH COST OF BAIL:
HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE ON MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE COMMUNITY
MILLIONS 4 (2016), http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/High%20Cost%20of
%20Bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5MV-AZCD] (finding Maryland communities were charged
more than $256 million in non-refundable corporate bail premiums from 2011 to 2015 and
noting that more than $75 million in premiums were collected in cases that were resolved
without any finding of wrongdoing); see also JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR
PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE
PRETRIAL JUSTICE (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents
/_for_better_or_for_profit_.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2X8-L3VX].
219 See Annalies Winny, Demorrea Tarver’s Charges Were Dropped, but the 10 Percent
Fee He Promised a Bail Bondsman on His $275,000 Bail Has Him Drowning in Debt, BALT.
CITY PAPER (July 20, 2016), http://www.citypaper.com/news/mobtownbeat/bcp-072016-mob
-bail-20160720-story.html; see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Maryland Access to Justice
Story: Indigent Defendants’ Right to Counsel at First Appearance, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG.
GENDER & CLASS 1, 21 (2015) (documenting the “powerful bail bond industry[’s]” opposition
to bail reform).
220 See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS: IDENTIFYING
OPPORTUNITIES TO SAFELY AND RESPONSIBLY REDUCE THE JAIL POPULATION 13 (2013)
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This, then, provides the ultimate context for Paul Clement’s argument before the
Maryland Court of Appeals—made on behalf of the bail-bond industry—against a
constitutional right to affordable bail. When Clement argued no right exists because
“even at the time of the framing, not everybody had the same amount of money, and
there were some people who were going to face a bail that they couldn’t afford,”221
he abandoned basic constitutional norms. Perhaps at the time of the framing, un-
affordable bail was tolerated.222 But so too was slavery tolerated. The Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments changed the law and discursive norms. Under our amended
Constitution, the one that governs us now, unequal justice is as abhorrent as involun-
tary servitude. To argue otherwise is beyond the pale and illegitimate.
The bail-bond industry’s answer—that unequal justice is irrelevant here because
the Griffin-line cases do not extend to the bail situation—is also illegitimate. From
the moment Griffin was announced, jurists recognized its equal justice principle did
apply to bail. Pretrial, an indigent defendant is as legally innocent and as entitled to
freedom as a rich defendant. If the Griffin-line of criminal cases stand for anything,
it is for an outright constitutional prohibition on incarcerating indigents solely because
of their indigency.223 The entirely legitimate authority surveyed in this Part puts this
proposition beyond cavil. To contend otherwise sanctions intolerable discrimination.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued on behalf of a constitutional right to affordable bail.
Having shown that legitimate precedent favors the right and proven the illegitimacy
of the so-called “wall of authority” rejecting it, we conclude by briefly reviewing
and answering other possible objections.
(tracking the amount of accused individuals in New Jersey prisons on an average day). The
report found that 1,547 inmates (twelve percent of the entire population) were held in custody
due to an inability to pay $2,500 or less. Nearly 800 inmates could not afford to post a bail under
$500. Id.
221 See COA Hearing, Testimony of Paul Clement, supra note 9, at 4:38–4:50.
222 Unaffordable bail at the time of the framing of the Constitution was only tolerated in
extremely rare situations, where a “personal surety” was not sufficient to cover what the
reviewing court believed was appropriate for the specific defendant. A “personal surety”
during this time period was akin to what we consider an unsecured bond: a promise to pay
in the event of a non-appearance at trial. See TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, NAT’L INST. OF CORR.,
MONEY AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAKEHOLDER: THE JUDGE’S DECISION TO RELEASE OR DE-
TAIN A DEFENDANT PRETRIAL 19–22 (2014), https://www.pretrial.org/download/research
/Money%20as%20a%20Criminal%20Justice%20Stakeholder.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2RU
-WY5U].
223 Cf. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1970) (“[O]nce the State has defined the
outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may
not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment . . . solely
by reason of their indigency.”).
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Critics of the affordable bail right could assert that accepting its recognition
would improperly require release for all pretrial detainees. Throwing jail doors open,
the critique continues, will result in defendants skipping court and avoiding justice,
and will end in increased crime and violence. Luckily, no such parade of horribles
will ever occur because the release-for-all argument starts from a false premise.
The right to affordable bail does not entail a right to bail in all cases. Indeed,
bail can be denied altogether on proof of potential dangerousness or flight risk.224
Salerno remains the law. The equal-justice principle therefore does not require bail
for all or universal release. Rather, consistent with Griffin and its progeny, it only
requires affordable bail once bail is on the table.225 The right to bail can be denied
altogether, but once offered, it cannot offend equal justice.226
Another potential objection is that recognizing an affordable bail right will leave
the system vulnerable to gaming and manipulation. Defendants will claim they
cannot afford to pay bail and secure improper release as a practical matter. First, this
objection only applies to defendants not deemed too dangerous under Salerno.227
Second, the concern itself is overblown.
Abstract endorsement of the affordable-bail right does not require judges to
accept every defendant’s proffer regarding his or her available means. In concrete
cases, judges may reject assertions that bail amounts cannot be met. High bail amounts
for wealthy accused criminals who pose a flight risk, for example, may be justified.
Some wealthy defendants might complain that their assets are tied up and unavailable,
but judges facing such complaints would not have to automatically release them. In
the end, affordability is a question of fact, and fact-finding remains an individualized
inquiry based on evidence.228 Appellate review of affordability determinations insu-
lates against miscarriages of justice.
A final objection is philosophical, and goes to the role of constitutional law in
American society. Justice Burton captured the sentiment in his Griffin dissent when
he noted that “[p]ersons charged with crimes stand before the law with varying
degrees of economic and social advantage. Some can afford better lawyers and better
investigations of their cases. Some can afford bail, some cannot.”229 The role of the
courts, he insisted, is not to make every defendant “economically equal before [the
State’s] bar of justice.”230
224 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748–49 (1987).
225 See id. at 753–54.
226 Of course, this is precisely opposite to the bail-industry’s view, voiced by Paul Clement,
that the Constitution guarantees the option of bail, but not that everyone will have the means to
make it. See COA Hearing, Testimony of Paul Clement, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
227 See 481 U.S. at 748–49.
228 This system thus does not do away with the idea that defendants need “skin in the
game” to show up for court. However, defendants are only required to offer up such skin as
they actually can based on an evidence-based inquiry into their means.
229 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 28–29 (1956) (Burton, J., dissenting).
230 Id. at 28.
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The response here begins by noting that Justice Burton’s dissent came in 1956,
five years before Gideon v. Wainwright231 held that the Constitution requires courts
to appoint counsel in criminal cases for defendants that could not afford to hire their
own.232 Writing for a unanimous Court in Gideon, Justice Black observed:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions
and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribu-
nals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.233
The Constitution may not require social and economic equality, but it does require
equal justice. When Justice Burton wrote his dissent in Griffin, the Supreme Court had
not yet established that the Constitution requires affordable lawyers.234 Naturally,
his dissent in Griffin therefore reasoned that it did not require affordable bail.235
Thankfully, times have changed. We now live in an era where inequality
demands redress. Some may seek to build walls to keep out the poor, but many more
wish to tear down such walls and let freedom reign. The fight for equal justice, as
history has shown time and time again, is often regrettably a slow-moving, tumultu-
ous, and unpredictable battle. While these walls may not be demolished in a single
swoop, an increasing number of jurisdictions are beginning to shed light on the
disparate effects that the bail industry wreaks on poorer defendants.236 Recognizing
a right to affordable bail may not bring full justice for the 99% against the 1%, but
it is an important step in the right direction.
231 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
232 Id. at 344.
233 Id.
234 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 28–29 (Burton, J., dissenting).
235 Id.
236 See Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 963 (Mass. 2017). While the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court declined to rule that all defendants have a right to affordable bail,
it did note that when
a judge sets bail in an amount so far beyond a defendant’s ability to pay
that it is likely to result in long-term pretrial detention, it is the functional
equivalent of an order for pretrial detention, and the judge’s decision
must be evaluated in light of the same due process requirements applica-
ble to such a deprivation of liberty.
Id. In this sense, any bail amount that is unattainable for a particular defendant is to be
viewed with strict scrutiny, and checked with the same rigorous standards that Salerno created
in situations when bail is revoked.

